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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
JefferyGriggappeals from the Judgment and Commitment and Order of
Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment. After the district court denied his
motion to suppress, Mr. Grigg entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of
possession of a controlled substance. Mr. Grigg asserts that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence because his right to be free from
unreasonable seizures, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, was violated
when law enforcement officers improperly seized him without reasonable suspicion, and
as such, the evidence derived from the improper seizure must be suppressed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns
On October 2, 2008, an Information was filed charging Mr. Grigg with possession
of a controlled substance. (R., pp.22-23.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Grigg filed a Motion to
Suppress Evidence AdmissionlConfession and Notice of Hearing requesting that the
district court suppress evidence, specifically controlled substances and paraphernalia,
"obtained as a result of the warrantless seizure, search, and illegal detention of the
defendant, and suppression the admissions/confessions . . . made as a result of the
warrantless seizure, search, and illegal detention of the defendant." (R., pp.28-29.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.41-43.)
At the hearing, the district court took judicial notice of Officer Klitch's testimony at
the preliminary hearing.

(Tr.1115109, p.9, Ls.12-17.)

Officer Klitch testified that he

stopped at a park in Nampa and began to chat with some visitors to the park.
(Tr.9125108, p.6, L.8 - p.7, L.24.) After talking to the occupants of a SUV, Officer Klitch
approached a second car, later determined to belong to Mr. Grigg. (Tr.9125108, p.8,
Ls.1-23.) Soon after approaching the car, Officer Klitch noticed that Mr. Grigg "had a
white substance around his mouth which I thought was unusual. Also he had eyelid
tremors. He had reddening of the conjunctiva of his eyes and he also had glassy
bloodshot eyes, which through my training and experience led me to believe that the
subject was under the influence of drugs." (Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6

- p.10, L.1.)

Officer

Klitch went on to testify that in his training he learned that eyelid tremors and reddening
of the conjunctiva were indicators of marijuana use and that glassy bloodshot eyes were
indicative of impairment by alcohol or drugs. (Tr.9125108, p.10, L.17

- p.1I , L.lO.)

Based upon these observations, Officer Klitch ordered Mr. Grigg out of the car and
began to investigate him for being under the influence of drugs in a public place.
(Tr.9125108, p.1 I , Ls.11-19.) Following this initial detention, Mr. Grigg made admissions
that there were illegal substances in his car and he was eventually arrested for felony
possession of a controlled substance. (Tr.9125108, p.13, L.17 - p.14, L.5, p.20 , Ls.1217.)
Mr. Grigg testified on his own behalf at the suppression hearing. (Tr.l/15/09,
p.14, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Grigg testified that he was parked in a park, attempting to repair in
cigaEtte lighter so he could charge his cell phone when he was approached by a police
officer. (Tr.1115109, p.14, L.11 - p.16, L.5.) The officer asked what he was doing and
then requested his ID. (Tr.1115/09, p.16, Ls.23-25.) Shortly thereafter, Officer Klitch
ordered Mr. Grigg out of the car. (Tr.1115109, p.18, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Grigg testified that

during this initial encounter he was wearing his sunglasses and that the officer could not
have observed his eyes. (Tr.1115/09, p.18, Ls.14-25.)
The district court also considered the video recording of the latter portion of the
detention, the search, and arrest. (R., p.43; Exhibit A-2.) At the hearing, defense
counsel argued that, "Trooper Klitch was well within his rights to go up and talk to the
defendant. Where he stepped over the line was ordering him from the vehicle based on
the sketchy evidence that was adduced at the preliminary hearing." (Tr.1/15/09, p.29,

The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.44.) Specifically, the
district court found that:
This is a case in which there was a - it was approximately 5:00 or 6:00 at
night. It was a summer evening. The sun was out. The defendant's car
was parked in the shade at a park.
The officer made consensual contact initially. That contact soon
turned into an investigative detention, commonly what would fall within
that Terry type of stop, in between an arrest and consensual contact.
And then eventually turned into a full-blown arrest and a search.
The primary issues addressed in this case were, one, the
conflicting credibility of the testimony at the preliminary hearing of the
officer, versus the defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing.
The officer testified in the preliminary hearing, which was submitted with
[tlhis hearing, that when he made the initial contact with the defendant,
he observed white substance around his mouth, and the defendant had
eye tremors, reddening of the conjunctiva of the eye and glassy, blood
shot eyes. And based on his experience, it caused him to believe that he
was under the influence of drugs.
He makes reference, both on the video and in his testimony, to a
statute that makes it a crime to be under the influence of a controlled
substance in public.

Now, the defendant testified under oath that he was wearing
sunglasses at the time and that the officer could not have seen his eyes.
Now, I looked at the video, and the car is clearly in the shade, and is
clearly shaded at the time. The officer talks to him again on the video
about why he came up and talked to him, and the officer goes on to
discuss with the defendant the physical indicators, glassy, bloodshot
eyes, eye tremor. Later the officer says again, "I saw your eyes," and
gets to the point of "tremors when you closed you eyes," et cetera, et
cetera.
Although the defendant had his sunglasses hanging on his shirt,
at no time in that discussion ever, at any time when they had that
colloquy, was there any mention about "You couldn't have seen my eyes.
I had sunglasses on."
Now, why is that significant? Because it goes to the credibility of
the witnesses here. Suddenly several months later, "I had my
sunglasses on." I don't buy it. Credibility is an issue, and I found that
not to be credible.
Having noted that, that means then, that I buy the officer's
testimony that he made the observations. Now, that's still pretty - it's not
a significant observation, other than he did testify at the preliminary
hearing that that was his conclusion, based on his training. And so at
that point, the consensual contact becomes investigatory. He asked for
his driver's license, he runs a check. At one point later he does give the
defendant Miranda rights.

So there was a consensual contact initially. It went into an
investigatory detention. There was a reasonable basis for it to do so,
based on the officer's observation. I have considered the conflicting
testimony and looked at the video and seen clearly that the car was in
the shade.
And I even - I take that back. Even in the tape, in the audio, the
videolaudio, the defendant states that he picked that spot to park his
case and work on his cigarette lighter to get the charger to work or
something, because - he picked it because it was shady.
And so the whole point is that he's in the shade working on his car
to fix his cigarette lighter to make sure it will charge up his - whatever
device he had. And I just find the credibility of the testimony to be, no,
he wasn't wearing his sunglasses. He was in the shade looking at the
thing. And that the officer's testimony has credibility.

So as the dominos go, the sequence occurred with probable
cause, or reasonable cause for the detention, and then probable cause
for the search. There was the automobile exception. It was parked in the car was parked in a parking lot in a public park. And so that's it. I'm
denying the motion to suppress.
(Tr.1/16/09, p.5, L.13-p.10, L.6.)
Following the denial of the motion to suppress, Mr. Grigg entered a conditional
guilty plea to the charge, reserving his right to appeal the denial of the suppression
motion. (R., pp.45-48, 56-57.) Mr. Grigg was sentenced to a unified sentence of seven
years, with three years fixed, suspended for a five year probationary term. (R., pp.6366.) Mr. Grigg filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment and Commitment and
Order of Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment. (R., pp.67-69.)

ISSUE

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Grigg's motion to suppress?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Griqq's Motion To Su~press
A.

Introduction
Mr. Grigg's right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated when

officers illegally seized him. The State failed to meet its burden of proof, failing to show
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Grigg. The officer could not
seize Mr. Grigg without reasonable suspicion and, as such, the district court's order
denying Mr. Grigg's motion to suppress should be reversed.
B.

Standard Of Review
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferfy, 139 ldaho

336, 338, 79 P.3d 157, 159 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress
is challenged, the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence
are accepted; however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found
are freely reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 ldaho 885, 886, 26 P.3d 1222, 1223 (2001).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh
evidence, resolve factual conflicts and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court. State V. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Griqcl's Motion To Su~oress
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of these constitutional
rights is to "impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by

governmental agents and thereby safeguard an individual's privacy and security against
arbitrary invasions." State v. Nladdox, 137 ldaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App.
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The United States
Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a
criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United
Sfafes, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
1.

The Officer Lacked Reasonable Suspicion To Detain Mr. G r i ~

The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to the seizures of persons through detentions falling short of arrest or an arrest.
United Sfafes v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16 (1968). When the purpose of the detention is to investigate a possible traffic offense
or other crime, it must be based upon reasonable, aritculable suspicion of criminal
activity. State

V.

Schumacher, 136 ldaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001); Florida v.

Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).

Although the required information leading to

formation of reasonable suspicion in the mind of the police officer is less than the
information required to form probable cause, it still "must be more than mere
speculation or a hunch on the part of the police officer." Sfate v. Cerino, 141 ldaho 736,
738, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2005). The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion
is evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure.
Flowers, 131 ldaho at 208, 953 P.2d at 648.

In the case at hand, the State presented only the evidence that Mr. Grigg was
having issues with his eyes when Officer Klitch approached him. (Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 p.10, L.1.)

Specifically, Officer Klitch noted that, "he had eyelid tremors. He had

reddening of the conjunctiva of his eyes and he also had glassy bloodshot eyes . . ."
(Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 - p.10, L.I.) The officer testified that these eye problems can be
indicative of drug use. (Tr.9125108, p.9, L.6 - p.10, L.1.)
While the district court did ultimately find that this was sufficient to provide
reasonable suspicion, it noted that, "Now, that's still pretty

-

it's not a significant

observation, other than he did testify at the preliminary hearing that that was his
conclusion, based on his training." (Tr.1116109, p.7, Ls.22-25.) As such, the district
court appeared to struggle with these indicators being sufficient to provide reasonable
suspicion.
Mr. Grigg asserts that eyelid tremors, reddening of the conjunctiva, and glassy
bloodshot eyes are, alone, not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that an
individual is under the influence of illegal substances. Contrary to the district court's
ultimate finding, the State failed to provide evidence of reasonable articulable suspicion
to detain Mr. Grigg and, therefore, all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal seizure
of his person must be suppressed.
2.

All Evidence Collected Against Mr. Griqq Followinq The llleqal Detention
Must Be Suppressed As It Is Fruit Of The Illegal Governmental Activity

The application of the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence is appropriate only
to evidence that is fruit of the illegal governmental activity. Segura v. Unifed Sfates, 468
U.S. 796, 815 (1984); Wong Sun v. Unifed States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Sfafe v.

Bainbridge, 117 ldaho 245, 249, 787 P.2d 231, 235 (1990). The test is "whether,
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting
MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT, p. 221 (1959)). Suppression is required only if "the
evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come to light but for the
government's unconstitutional conduct." State V. Wigginton, 142 ldaho 180, 184, 125
P.3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d at 1131).
In the case at hand, the above evidence clearly shows that Mr. Grigg was
illegally seized without reasonable suspicion. Had Mr. Grigg not been illegally seized,
the evidence located in the vehicle would not have been discovered. The State failed to
meet its burden in showing that the evidence is untainted; therefore, ail the evidence
collected after the impermissible seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the illegal police
activity.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Grigg respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 13" day of October, 2009.
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